How to include socio-economic considerations in decision-making on agricultural biotechnology?:Two models from Kenya and South Africa by Beumer, Koen
  
 University of Groningen




Agriculture & Human Values
DOI:
10.1007/s10460-019-09934-1
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2019
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Beumer, K. (2019). How to include socio-economic considerations in decision-making on agricultural
biotechnology? Two models from Kenya and South Africa. Agriculture & Human Values, 36(4), 669-684.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10460-019-09934-1
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 11-12-2019
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Agriculture and Human Values (2019) 36:669–684 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10460-019-09934-1
How to include socio‑economic considerations in decision‑making 
on agricultural biotechnology? Two models from Kenya and South 
Africa
Koen Beumer1,2
Accepted: 23 March 2019 / Published online: 3 April 2019 
© The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
This article contributes to the debate about how regulatory science for agricultural technologies can be ‘opened up’ for a 
more diverse set of concerns and knowledges. The article focuses on the regulation of ‘socio-economic considerations’ for 
genetically modified organisms. While numerous countries have declared their intent to include these considerations in 
biotechnology decision-making, it is currently unclear both what counts as a socio-economic consideration and how such 
considerations should be assessed. This article provides greater clarity about how socio-economic considerations can be 
included in regulations by drawing upon the experience of two countries whose efforts in this field are particularly advanced: 
Kenya and South Africa. Based on extensive fieldwork, this article identifies the contours of an emerging regulatory regime 
by presenting two practice-based models for including socio-economic considerations in biotechnology decision-making. 
Whereas Kenya has taken a bottom-up process prior to assessing the first technologies and strongly emphasises scientific 
expertise, South Africa has instead established regulatory standards in an ad hoc fashion on a case-to-case basis, with a less 
prominent role for scientific evidence. The discussion of the distinct characteristics and tensions of both models provides 
insight into two potential pathways for including socio-economic considerations in the regulation of agricultural technologies.
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Introduction
One of the recurring criticisms of regulatory science is that 
it functions to erroneously ‘close down’ the appraisal of food 
and agricultural technologies (Stirling 2008). The starting 
point for these critiques is the recognition that discussions 
about new food and agricultural technologies are “not just 
about the pros and cons of a particular set of technologies, 
but about politics and values and the future of agrarian 
society” (Scoones 2008). From this perspective, regulatory 
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science has been criticized for predominantly framing issues 
in terms of risk to human health and the environment. While 
these issues are certainly important, the predominant focus 
on risks to human health and the environment has been criti-
cized for narrowing down the scope of societal appraisal, 
and for relegating issues of risk to the realm of specialists, 
thereby excluding other types of knowledge and expertise 
from the decision-making process (Levidow and Carr 1997; 
Chataway and Tait 1993; Wynne 2001, 2005; Jasanoff 2005). 
The issue is ‘scientized’, as one commentator described it 
(Kinchy 2010).
This article takes forward these criticisms and investi-
gates attempts to expand regulatory science and include 
different types of concerns and knowledges. In particular, I 
focus on the regulation of ‘socio-economic considerations’ 
(SECs) for genetically modified organisms. The concept 
‘socio-economic considerations’ emerged in biotechnology 
regulation in the context of the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-
diversity (CPB), an international agreement that, amongst 
others, regulates the cross-border movement of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs). Article 26 of the protocol 
provided countries the option to include “socio-economic 
considerations arising from the impact of living modified 
organisms” (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity 2000, p. 19). The ethical, social, and economic 
consequences of genetically modified organisms has been 
subject to intense societal controversy over the last decades, 
and Article 26 for the first time provides countries with the 
possibility to take into account these widely perceived soci-
etal concerns into their regulations. Numerous countries 
have meanwhile declared their intent to include these con-
siderations in biotechnology decision-making for regulating 
both the import and domestic development of genetically 
modified organisms, including Argentina, China, Mexico, 
the Philippines, the Netherlands, Norway, Kenya, and South 
Africa (Falck-Zepeda et al. 2013).
In practice, however, it is far from clear what it means 
to include SECs in decision-making. For example there 
are vast differences in the definition of socio-economic 
considerations. While narrow interpretations limit the 
definition of SECs to economic effects on farmers rela-
tive to existing crops, wider definitions include anything 
from impacts on gender, income, indigenous communi-
ties, and even cultural and religious concerns. Further-
more, traditionally the regulation of GMOs has heavily 
focused on sanitary and phytosanitary measures and the 
possibility to include SECs in decision-making—rather 
than leaving these to the market—is a rather new devel-
opment. As a consequence, not only is there considerable 
lack of clarity as to what counts as a valid socio-economic 
consideration, also, as RAEIN-Africa (2012, p. 1) notes, 
“whilst methodology for environmental and health risk 
assessment is well-developed the same cannot be said 
for SEIA [socio-economic impact assessment].” Hence 
it remains unclear what impacts should be considered 
under Article 26, how such impacts should be assessed, 
and how decisions should eventually be reached. Actors 
across the board have cited this lack of clarity a cause of 
concern, amongst others because of fears that SECs will 
only act “as justifications for the imposition of trade barri-
ers” (Kerr et al. 2014) and because the ensuing regulatory 
uncertainty may deter investments in potentially beneficial 
technologies.
This article aims to provide greater clarity about how 
SECs can be regulated based on ethnographic observations 
in two countries whose efforts in this field are particu-
larly advanced: Kenya and South Africa. In both coun-
tries, there are significant societal controversies around 
GMOs, often revolving around socio-economic impacts of 
the technology, thus sparking the need for including these 
considerations in decision-making processes. The promi-
nence of African countries in this endeavour fits within a 
larger trend in that was already visible during the negotia-
tions for the Cartagena Protocol, when most developed 
countries argued that SECs should not be included because 
they could better be left to market conditions and hence 
were “of little relevance” to the Cartagena Protocol (Secre-
tariat of the CBD 2003, p. 79), while African countries on 
the other hand presented the most comprehensive submis-
sion of socio-economic factors. Although several devel-
oped nations have meanwhile taken pro-active attempts 
to include SECs (for instance see COGEM (2009) for the 
Netherlands and Binimelis and Myhr (2016) for Norway), 
it is hence not surprising that Kenya and South Africa, 
frontrunners in African biotechnology, have been particu-
larly advanced in shaping regulatory practices for SECs.
By providing a detailed account the work done under 
Article 26 of the Cartagena protocol at the national level, 
this article identifies the contours of an emerging regula-
tory regime. Based on extensive fieldwork in Kenya and 
South Africa, I will identify two practice-based models 
for including socio-economic considerations in biotech-
nology decision-making. Kenya and South Africa have 
taken different approaches to settle what SECs should (and 
should not) be taken into account, how these considera-
tions should be assessed, and how decisions are eventually 
reached. These experiences are set to become even more 
important as a new wave of technological developments 
in the field of genetic editing will raise new questions 
about the ethical, societal, and economic consequences 
of biotechnology. These two models, along with a critical 
discussion of their benefits and drawbacks, can provide 
guidance to other countries by highlighting different strat-
egies for dealing with the practical difficulties of including 
SECs into biotechnology decision-making.
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Socio‑economic considerations as a new 
object of regulation
Socio-economic considerations emerged in a context 
where the public debate about agricultural biotechnology 
continuously ‘overflowed’ the confines of the regulatory 
focus on risks to human health and the environment. The 
concept of ‘socio-economic considerations’ can be under-
stood as a response to this perceived gap between the nar-
row focus on risks in regulation and the broader concerns 
that are expressed in public debates. The term entered bio-
technology regulations as a compromise in negotiations 
in the context of the Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity. 
As countries were unable to reach consensus over the 
inclusion of criteria other than those concerning risk and 
trade, the compromise was reached to provide countries 
the option to include SECs in decision-making (Secretariat 
of the CBD 2003). This was articulated in Article 26 of the 
Protocol, noting that signatories of the Protocol:
“may take into account, consistent with their inter-
national obligations, socio-economic considerations 
arising from the impact of living modified organisms 
on the conservation and sustainable use of biologi-
cal diversity, especially with regard to the value of 
biological diversity to indigenous and local commu-
nities” (Secretariat of the CBD 2000, p. 19).
Although the Cartagena Protocol focused on the trans-
boundary movement of GMOs, discussions and regula-
tions of SECs soon transcended this focus. As we will see 
later, also in Kenya and South Africa the regulation of 
SECs is not limited to transboundary movements. Never-
theless, it was the adoption of the Cartagena Protocol that 
spurred debate about the definitions and scope of SECs—
i.e. about what counts as a valid SECs. In the most narrow 
int erpretation, SECs only apply to the impact genetically 
modified organisms on the value of biological diversity 
to indigenous and local communities, as is described in 
Article 26 (Jaffe 2005). In its broadest interpretation, a 
wide variety of concerns can be shared under the heading 
of SECs. RAEIN-Africa (2012), COGEM (2009), Lud-
low et al. (2014) and Fransen et al. (2005) for instance 
mention economic impacts such as the costs of inputs and 
labour, the impact on employment, food supply, and on 
recreation; social impacts such as freedom of consumer 
choice, equity issues along the lines of gender and age, and 
religious beliefs; and cultural impacts such as traditional 
seed exchange systems, cultural uses of biodiversity, and 
cropping practices associated with indigenous knowledge 
systems. All these considerations seem to share, is that 
their object of regulation is not risks to human health and 
the environment.
Questions have furthermore been raised about how SECs 
should be assessed and how decisions should eventually be 
reached. Various scholars and organizations have for exam-
ple discussed the benefits and drawbacks for ex ante or ex 
post assessments (Falck-Zepeda 2009) and the importance 
of carefully manage the expectations arising from regula-
tory frameworks (COGEM 2014). Also different methodolo-
gies have been proposed for performing these assessments, 
ranging from economics-oriented methods like cost–benefit 
analysis (Hall and Moran 2003), social-economic impact 
analysis (Stabinsky 2000), and effectiveness tests (Chatur-
vedi et al. 2012), to broader frameworks that include dif-
ferent types of public participation (Fransen et al. 2005), 
scenario planning methodologies (AHTEG-SEC 2014), and 
problem formulation tools (Tepfer et al. 2013).
There has hence been quite some work that enables coun-
tries to shape their regulations for SECs. There have been a 
few attempts to sketch the broad outlines of existing regula-
tory schemes that include SECs (COP-MOP 2008; Falck-
Zepeda 2009; Falck-Zepeda and Zambrano 2011; Binimelis 
and Myhr 2016), including for example Argentina, where the 
assessment of SECs is limited to impacts on trade, which 
are assessed using principles from cost–benefit analysis. 
And the regulation of SECs has also repeatedly received a 
prominent place on the agenda of the Conference of Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Protocol (COP-
MOP), the European Committee, and the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization, amongst others. However, despite these 
efforts, and despite the fact that numerous countries have 
pledged to include SECs in their decision-making processes, 
these attempts are hampered because as of yet “there is little 
experience in dealing with these issues in actual decision-
making processes” (Fransen et al. 2005, p. 7). Even in a 
country like Norway, which is often referred to as having 
a progressive system for including SECs, thus far did not 
experience cases where SECs played a decisive role in 
decision-making (Rosendal and Myhr 2009). Despite these 
efforts, overall little consensus has emerged over the defini-
tion and scope of SECs, the way SECs should be assessed, 
and the distribution of roles between different stakeholders 
in the decision-making process.
In the absence of consensus over what counts as valid 
socio-economic considerations and how to assess them, 
countries are caught in between seemingly mutually exclu-
sive desires. On the one hand, these countries wish to 
broaden the scope of valid regulatory concerns to include 
issues beyond risks to human health and the environment. 
Doing so, on the other hand, risks ruling out potentially ben-
eficial technologies since SECs “may constitute an unwork-
able hurdle if the assessment procedure is not clearly defined 
up front” (Falck-Zepeda 2009). Failing to define what SECs 
are taken into considerations and how these can best be 
assessed could bar potentially beneficial technologies to 
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enter countries and could hamper technological progress 
as it dis-incentivizes researchers to put time and effort in 
developing new agricultural biotechnologies that may later 
be rejected.
This article suggests one way to overcome this conun-
drum is to take a practice-based approach to regulation that 
draws on literature from the sociology of science and tech-
nology. This will be set out in the next section.
Theoretical and methodological approach
The practice-based approach taken in this article can best be 
explained by contrasting it to what will be called a ‘tradi-
tional’ approach to regulation. In this traditional approach, 
a strong distinction is made between the ‘science-based’ 
regulation of health and environmental risks and the sup-
posedly ‘non-scientific’ nature of regulations based on other 
concerns, like socio-economic considerations. The scientific 
basis of regulations of health and environmental risks is for 
instance articulated in the WTO agreement on the applica-
tion of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), which 
specifies that trade-curtailing measures may only be taken 
if “based on scientific principles” and “sufficient scientific 
evidence” (WTO 1995). From this perspective, including 
SECs in decision-making potentially opens the floodgates 
to various ‘non-scientific justifications’ that hamper trade.
This view is founded upon the assumption that the objec-
tive or subjective nature of regulatory practices are somehow 
inherent to the regulated concern. In this reading the very 
nature of SECs makes it impossible for them to be regulated 
in an objective and predictable manner because they amount 
to mere opinions, values, and political interests that cannot 
be dealt with through science. This article builds upon sev-
eral authors who have earlier rejected this seemingly clear 
distinction. Kleinman and Kinchy (2007) for instance point 
out that this distinction itself rests upon views about the con-
ditions under which circumvention of the market is deemed 
legitimate that are themselves informed by neoliberal ideol-
ogy. The attempt to entrench this ideologically informed dis-
tinction by characterizing the regulation of risks as scientific 
and delegating all other forms of regulation as unscientific 
is a form of scientism that cannot be reasonably be defended 
(Kinchy et al. 2008).
This article instead adopts a practice-based approach to 
regulation. This perspective helps to show that differences in 
objectivity or subjectivity (and predictability or unpredict-
ability) of different objects of regulation are the outcome of 
particular practices through which actors either manage or 
fail to agree on what constitutes valid conditions for market 
intervention. Agreement over what counts as a risks and how 
to measure that risk is not a given that is implicated in the 
nature of the object of regulation: it instead comes into view 
as a consensus that has slowly evolved over course of the last 
centuries (Luhmann 1993; Boholm 2015), reflecting both the 
value that is attributed to human health and the environment, 
the objects that are considered to pose a risk to those values, 
and the particular types of knowledge that are considered 
credible (e.g. Porter 1996; Jasanoff 2005).
This perspective furthermore draws attention to all the 
practices involved in producing the knowledge about the 
object of regulation that enables objective forms of decision-
making (de Vries et al. 2011; Boholm 2015; Beumer 2017). 
For instance, in the case of risks to human health and the 
environment thousands of people work to isolate relevant 
properties, administer those in a particular dosage, carefully 
selected animal models, whose exposure to the risk object 
is in turn measured after a particular period, using care-
fully calibrated machines, operated by staff with the right 
educational background, who look for damage done by the 
risk object in predetermined organs in the animal models.
Socio-economic considerations, in contrast, present regu-
lators with a largely new concern for which it has not yet 
been crystallized what work is required to take them into 
account in decision-making. From this perspective, the dif-
ference between objective/science-based/predictable regula-
tion of risks and subjective/politics-based/unpredictable reg-
ulation of SECs comes into view as the difference between 
a practice that is well-established and a practice that is only 
emerging. Although there is certainly no guarantee that the 
regulation of SECs will travel the same path as SPS, the 
practice-based perspective helps to highlight that in theory, 
SECs too can evolve over time from subjective to objective 
and from unpredictable to predictable. There are no inherent 
properties to SECs as an object of regulation that prevent a 
potential consensus to emerge over what counts as a valid 
SEC and how this can best be measured (Table 1).
This has consequences for the purpose of identifying the 
contours of a new regulatory regime. If the establishment 
of what counts as a valid SECs and what counts as valid 
evidence is the outcome of hard work, then the contours of 
the new regulatory regime can best be identified by observ-
ing the practices through which actors attempt to define and 
measure SECs. The question hence is what evolving prac-
tices can be observed through which SECs as an object of 
regulation are made sufficiently objective and predictable?
This article takes an ethnographic approach, which is par-
ticularly suited to investigate emerging practices that have not 
yet been fully formalized. I mainly rely upon two types of 
sources to identify relevant regulatory practices: semi-struc-
tured qualitative interviews and written documents. I spent 
a total of 3 weeks in Kenya in March 2016 and 3 weeks in 
South Africa in April 2016 to conduct semi-structured qualita-
tive interviews with a total of 39 people. This included inter-
views with government officials from different regulatory 
agencies and ministries, actors directly involved in drafting 
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the regulations, as well as scientists and companies filing 
applications, peer reviewers, and local and international non-
governmental organizations. The interviews were conducted 
in the home institute of the interviewee (in and around Nairobi 
and Eldoret in Kenya, in and around Pretoria, Onderstepoort, 
Midrand, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Somerset West and Stel-
lenbosch in South Africa) and they were fully transcribed. The 
semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed for compari-
sons between interviewees and countries while their open-
ended nature was essential in capturing regulatory practices 
that are not formalized in written documents and allowed the 
analyst to go further into detail when merited.
Interviews focused on actors that were closely involved in 
the regulation of SECs so as to gain a detailed understanding 
of the process through which particular considerations were 
included or excluded from the regulatory process and how 
decisions were taken to measure and assess these considera-
tions in particular ways. These interviews were supplemented 
with several other interviews with key actors who have been 
active in discussions about biotechnology regulation but 
who were less closely involved in the regulation of SECs. 
This helped to gain an alternative perspective on the events 
described by those closely involved in the regulatory process. 
Interviewees were first identified through a preliminary docu-
ment analysis and internet search and thereafter also by asking 
interviewees once in Kenya and South Africa to suggest names 
of other relevant actors.
The documents were gathered through an elaborate inter-
net search for which both academic and non-academic search 
engines were used (including EBSCOHOST, Google Scholar, 
and Google). Additional documents were gathered during field 
work, amongst others by asking interviewees if they could 
identify further relevant documents. Both documents were 
gathered that play a role in the regulatory process itself (such 
as laws, regulations, or guidelines) and documents that com-
ment upon the process (such as academic studies, newspaper 
articles, or organizational websites). Together the interviews 
and documents provide a good base for triangulating findings 
and tracing the emergence of a regulatory regime for SECs.
It was found that the regulation of SECs in Kenya was 
established largely separate from concrete applications 
whereas in South Africa the regulatory practices only emerged 
in the process of assessing concrete applications. The empiri-
cal sections mirror these differences and hence are structured 
rather differently.
Socio‑economic considerations in Kenyan 
biotechnology
Agricultural biotechnology regulation
Researchers in Kenya have been working on genetic modi-
fication since at least the early 1990s and the government 
has taken several steps to promote and regulate the tech-
nology since. In 1991, the National Advisory Commit-
tee on Biotechnology Advances and their Applications 
(NACBAA) was established to identify research priorities 
and 1 year later the Kenyan Agricultural Research Institute 
(KARI) formulated the first biosafety guidelines (Wafula 
1995). More recently the government approved a National 
Biotechnology Development Policy in 2006, outlining how 
Kenya could move ahead with biotechnology, and in 2009 
the Biosafety Act was approved by the Kenyan president. 
These events have been accompanied by significant resist-
ance, culminating in the 2012 imposition of a moratorium 
on the import of GMOs.
The 2009 Biosafety Act established the structures 
through which SECs were first explicitly addressed. The 
Act foresaw the establishment of a new competent author-
ity that was charged with the responsibility to implement 
the Act. This institute was called the National Biosafety 
Authority (NBA) and was placed under the Ministry of 
Science and Technology. The decision-making power is 
situated with the board of the biosafety authority, which by 
law consists of the chairperson and chief executive officer, 
along with scientists, interest groups, and representatives 
of various ministries and government agencies. The Act 
set forth different requirements for the contained use, 
environmental release, import, export, transit, and plac-
ing on the market of genetically modified organisms. SECs 
were solely included in the approval for the environmental 
release of genetically modified organisms. The Act notes 
that in reaching its decision, the Authority “shall take into 
Table 1  Differences in framing the regulation of risks and SECs
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures Socio-economic considerations
Traditional frame Science-based Politics-based
Objectivity follows from nature of object of regulation Subjectivity follows from nature of object of regulation
Practice-based frame Product of both science and politics Product of both science and politics
Well-established practice Newly emerging practice
Objectivity product of agreement over what constitutes 
valid evidence




account … socio-economic considerations arising from 
the impact of the genetically modified organism on the 
environment” (Government of Kenya 2011). As one civil 
servant highlighted, whereas the Cartagena protocol stated 
that parties may consider socio-economic factors, “when 
you look at our biosafety law, it says it is a mandatory 
thing” (interview 31 March 2016a).
The newly established National Biosafety Authority 
was charged with the responsibility to shape the regulation 
of SECs. SECs were eventually included in the applica-
tion procedure for environmental release in three distinct 
moments: first, through information provided by the appli-
cant, which is reviewed by socio-economic experts; sec-
ond, through public comments that are invited after every 
application; and third, in the final decision taken by the 
board of the biosafety authority about the environmental 
release. These three moments will now be discussed in 
greater detail.
The application form
In order to decide whether or not a genetically modified crop 
will be approved for environmental release, the National 
Biosafety Authority requires applicants to provide infor-
mation about the crop. Applicants therefore have to fill in 
a form consisting of a long list of detailed questions. The 
application process thereby “passes the ball to those who 
have developed the product” (interview 18 March 2016). 
SECs are not included in the form itself but applicants are 
obliged to provide information on socio-economic impacts 
in an annex (interview 31 March 2016a).
The Biosafety Act itself does not specify what SECs 
should be taken into consideration. As one industry actor 
told me, the passage about SECs in the Biosafety Act “is 
just a general statement that is put there but digging deeper 
into guidelines and everything else, there’s no other place 
you’ll find when looking into socioeconomic considerations” 
(interview 31 March 2016b). Different actors perceived this 
as problematic. For applicants this meant that there was lit-
tle clarity as to whether or not the Act’s requirements had 
been met. And regulators did not trust that applicants would 
provide sufficient and credible information in the absence of 
more specific criteria for providing information on SECs. 
As one former board member of the NBA mentioned: “they 
will give you biased information. An applicant will never tell 
you that our product is going to affect the choice of varieties 
from farmers, or that it’s going to take away from a variety 
which has medicinal value” (interview 17 March 2016a).
The biosafety authority therefore set out to create a stand-
ard operating procedure (SOP) for SECs. This document, in 
the words of one NBA employee, was supposed to provide 
“a guideline on what issues as NBA we want applicants to 
report, [and on what issues we want] the experts that we 
send the applications to for review to look for” (interview 31 
March 2016a). Initially the NBA board considered drafting 
the guidelines themselves, ensuring that the SECs consid-
ered “should not be varying from one applicant to another” 
(interview 17 March 2016a). As an example, a former board 
member pointed to the highland area of Kitale, where the 
bulk of maize in the country comes from, and suggested that 
“you can say for Kitale … we want that area to be free of 
any issues from GM” (interview 17 March 2016a). Instead 
the NBA opted for a more participative approach to develop 
the standard operating procedure by organizing a workshop 
that was meant to solicit views from various stakeholders 
about what SECs had to be included and how they should 
be assessed.
The workshop was facilitated by a well-known interna-
tional expert on SECs and was attended by about 25 different 
stakeholders, from scientists to consumer organizations, and 
from industry to environmental NGOs (interview 18 March 
2016). Both participants and the organizers of the workshop 
mentioned that the participants failed to reach consensus 
about how to regulate SECs. This was hardly surprising con-
sidering the antagonistic biotechnology debate in Kenya. 
Even the format of the workshop was subject to contestation. 
Actors from civil society organizations for instance noted 
that the international expert facilitating the workshop “is 
known to be a pro-GM person, … and that in itself tells 
me NBA is not interested in being impartial (interview 17 
March 2016b). In his introductory presentation the expert 
furthermore put a strong emphasis on economic issues, in 
particular on “comparing the economic benefit of growing 
Bt maize vis-à-vis growing normal hybrid maize” (interview 
17 March 2016b), thereby foreclosing discussions on non-
economic issues “like indigenous varieties, co-existence, 
… and the impact on non-target organism like butterflies 
and bees” (interview 17 March 2016b). Yet, despite the fact 
that “it was a wide group of people with various opinions” 
(interview 18 March 2016), as one biotechnology proponent 
tactfully noted, different participants that were interviewed 
noted that they were nevertheless able to openly put forward 
what SECs they thought should be included in the decision-
making process (NBA 2013).
Eventually “it was up to the NBA to decide what to take 
and what not to take” (interview 18 March 2016). Issues that 
were occasionally mentioned in literature on SECs but that 
were not brought up during the stakeholder workshop, like 
the impact on local seed systems or indigenous knowledge, 
were not included. Facing the lack of consensus amongst 
workshop participants, the biosafety authority simply 
included all SECs that were raised during the stakeholder 
workshop. The scope of the standard operating procedure 
was subsequently very broad, ranging from issues concern-
ing equal access of men and women to farmers income, and 
from enhanced nutritional composition (see Table 2).
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Significantly, the standard operating procedure takes the 
form of a series of questions, 25 in total. The questions are 
explicitly meant to provide guidance for applicants and regu-
lators about the type of issues that will be assessed. How 
these questions should be answered thus remains open, since 
the document specifies neither the information nor the meth-
ods required for answering these questions (with the possible 
exception of cost–benefit analysis).1 The standard operating 
procedure furthermore does not define clear benchmarks of 
what socio-economic impacts are considered desirable or 
unacceptable. The senior NBA official strongly emphasized 
this point: “Very importantly, if you remember the SOP, 
… the document is not saying ‘if it is so high, then it’s not 
acceptable’. There are questions that do not have limits as to 
how much” (interview 31 March 2016c).
After an application is submitted, the NBA staff screens 
whether the application is complete and sends the annex 
on SECs out for peer review. The review is done by social 
scientists specialized in socio-economic issues (hence not 
by biotechnology scientists). Their identities are kept confi-
dential, as one reviewer said, “because I think other people 
should not influence my decision and … because if I recom-
mend something negative then they can come for my neck” 
(interview 16 March 2016). The reviewers assess whether 
the information provided by the applicant is correct and 
whether all relevant information is provided.
In reviewing the information on SECs, the experts contin-
uously balance the ambitious assessment criteria with practi-
cal limitations. On the one hand the requirements are very 
high. For instance in assessing the correctness of informa-
tion provided, so one reviewer told me, evidence that has not 
been published in academic journals “may not be acceptable. 
… It’s just like I can sit down and write the paper” (inter-
view 16 March 2016). And even if the application draws on 
evidence that has been published in a peer reviewed journal, 
the anonymous experts are still required to review the quality 
of the scientific evidence. Although one reviewer highlights 
that deciding whether the evidence is sufficiently convinc-
ing is to some extent a subjective exercise, the reviewers 
generally follow basic scientific guidelines: “Was there a 
good sampling? Were the data collection methods good 
enough? Was the analysis good? Is the interpretation good? 
… It has to be good science” (interview 16 March 2016). 
Furthermore, in assessing the completeness of the informa-
tion, reviewers are instructed by the NBA staff to “go beyond 
what the applicant has provided because the applicant some-
times doesn’t have some information, or maybe they are shy-
ing away from giving some information that they feel can 
limit the approval” (interview 31 March 2016a).
In practice, on the other hand, it is not always feasible to 
meet these stringent criteria. The expert reviewers take into 
account such practical limitations in forming their judgment. 
For instance a reviewer pointed out that they understand that 
studies on consumer perception could only provide rough 
Table 2  Socioeconomic consideration criteria in the standard operating procedure
Concept Elements/criteria
Food security and sustainability Will there be increase in yield/ha? Will there be surplus for individuals/country? Will the technology be con-
tinuous? Will technology complement other income sources?
Access to the technology Will other technologies be available to guarantee freedom of choice? Will SEC increase time and cost of regu-
latory approvals hence delaying its adoption? Gender issues: women versus men
Income to farmers Will farmers make more money using GM technology compared to status quo? Will cost–benefit analysis be 
beneficial to farmers?
Cost of seeds and other inputs Are seeds and other farm inputs affordable to ordinary farmers? Does the technology reduce cost of produc-
tion? Are there economies of scale?
Co-existence How to ensure genetic integrity on organic and conventional food? How to deal with litigation?
Trade implications How approval of GM technology will impact on exports and other trade factors? Will Kenyan products access 
EU market? Are we going to be competitive? How will the technology affect our branding? Will it affect 
surpluses too?
Benefits and freedom of choice Any tangible benefits to consumer? - Reduced commodity prices, enhanced nutritional composition? Is the 
society healthier? Is there good labelling practices? Can consumers easily access conventional or organic 
products?
Biosafety and stewardship What happens if adverse effects are detected later when the product is in the market and people have consumed 
the GMO? Will farmers be trained and follow laid down GAPs?
1 For instance a question like “are seeds and other farm inputs afford-
able to ordinary farmers” may include information about the seed 
price, over which the applicant may have a certain amount of con-
trol, but could also include information about other factors affecting 
the economic situation of farmers, since this may determines what is 
affordable for farmers. Similarly, a question like “will other technolo-
gies be available to guarantee freedom of choice” may include infor-
mation about other commodities currently offered by the applicant 
but could also include an assessment of government policies and the 
strategies of competitors that structure this availability.
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indications since consumer behavior regularly changes after 
commodities enter the market. And several interviewees 
pointed out the difficulties in establishing the cross-national 
validity of socio-economic studies. Also here reviewers con-
sider the practical limitations of providing this information, 
noting that “it is preferable when we get continental data 
[from Africa], but if it is lacking then you can get other data 
from other countries” (interview 16 March 2016). Hence 
while preference is given to peer reviewed publications of 
the technology in question in Kenya, these are commonly not 
available, after which also evidence will be considered from 
similar technologies in the country, or otherwise of similar 
technologies in other countries. And despite the wide range 
of issues mentioned in the standard operating procedure, in 
practice the emphasis lies rather strongly on the economic 
impacts of the genetically modified crop. When asking a 
reviewer what information applicants have to provide, a 
reviewer noted:
“They’re supposed to include reports to show that the 
biotechnology is going to generate more income for 
the farmers. … That’s the bottom line. … And then the 
other be on the consumer side they have to show that 
the consumers are willing to consume the product. … 
We want consumers and producers to benefit” (inter-
view 16 March 2016).
In practice the reviewers strike a balance between the 
strict criteria of completeness and scientific validity on the 
one hand and practical limitations in providing that informa-
tion on the other—a practice that raised no objections by any 
of the actors interviewed. The expert reviewers subsequently 
write a report, including a recommendation, and send this to 
the board of the biosafety authority.
Public consultation
Next to the information that applicants have to provide, the 
second way that SECs enter the Kenyan decision-making 
process is through a public consultation. The Biosafety Act 
requires the NBA to inform the public about any applica-
tion for environmental release in order to provide the public 
with the opportunity to voice their opinion and to “address 
appropriately any relevant concerns raised by such a person” 
(Government of Kenya 2011). Formally the Act requires 
the NBA to publish a summary of the application in the 
Kenya Gazette and at least two nationally circulated news-
papers, after which concerns can be send to the NBA within 
30 days (Government of Kenya 2011; interview 31 March 
2016a). There are no restrictions on who can voice concerns, 
whether they are individual members of the public or repre-
sentatives of public or private organizations. Nor are there 
restrictions as to what concerns can be raised during this 
public consultation, including concerns about risks to human 
health and socio-economic considerations.
So far two applications for environmental release have 
gone through this procedure for a public hearing and in both 
cases the articulation of SECs by members of the public 
did not proceed without problems—an observation that was 
shared by the NBA itself. Several actors who wanted to sub-
mit comments during the public hearing, especially from 
NGOs, for instance pointed out that it is not a simple task to 
go through the technical aspects of applications, especially 
“if you’re not a scientist” (interview 17 March 2016b), as an 
actor from an environmental NGO testified. And this task 
was made even harder because the application is not readily 
available:
“The application is a big dossier, probably hundreds 
of pages. The National Biosafety Authority did not put 
this application document on their website. It was only 
available in their offices. … You can’t take it home, 
they couldn’t give you a copy, it was not available on 
their website” (interview 17 March 2016b).
The biosafety authority furthermore introduced an obliga-
tory form for written responses only days before the dead-
line for submitting comments, when most actors had already 
prepared their responses on their own terms. A civil society 
representative observed: “I think a lot still needs to be done 
in defining and actually organizing a meaningful public par-
ticipation process for biotechnology” (interview 29 March 
2016).
After receiving the public comments, staff from the 
biosafety authority analyzes them and makes a shift. Both 
NBA staff and outsiders mentioned that they proceed by 
first setting apart concerns and questions that can readily 
be answered. These public comments are addressed by the 
NBA itself. In all other cases the NBA asks the applicant to 
submit a written response to each of these issues. The public 
comments as well as the applicant’s reply are then sent to the 
NBA board, informing them that the “public listed the fol-
lowing issues, then we took the issues to the applicant, and 
this is the response” (interview 31 March 2016a).
The NBA board
Finally, the board of the biosafety authority gathers all this 
information: the annex on SECs that is provided by the 
applicant, the report and recommendations of the expert 
reviewer, the comments from the public consultation, and 
the replies by the applicant. The NBA board is responsible 
for taking an overall decision about whether the application 
for environmental release is granted. The board first consid-
ers the risks to human health and the environment. Once an 
application has met the criteria for sanitary and phytosani-
tary impacts the board subsequently takes into account the 
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different SECs that have been articulated by the applicant, 
the expert reviewers, and the public.
Crucially, thus far it has remained unclear how the board 
weighs SECs in the decision-making process. Both NBA 
staff members and current and former members of the board 
confirmed that such a procedure is currently missing. The 
preceding procedure for articulating and assessing SECs—
the standard operating procedure, the application annex, 
the expert review and the public consultation—certainly 
shapes what considerations can and cannot be included by 
the board. But each of these steps is explicitly framed as pro-
viding information to the board of the NBA, thereby situat-
ing the final authority to include SECs into decision making 
with the board of the biosafety authority. Thus far two appli-
cations have gone through the entire procedure—one for a 
Bt maize event and one for a Bt cotton event. While in both 
cases permission was granted for environmental release, it 
has remained curiously unclear what role socio-economic 
considerations played in reaching that decision, if any. In the 
absence of clarity about how the board reaches its final deci-
sion, both applicants aiming to put GM crops on the market 
and actors concerned about the negative socio-economic 
impact of those GM crops are left in the dark as to what 
socio-economic considerations are decisive.
Kenya: bottom‑up and inclusive
The regulation of socio-economic considerations in Kenya 
was predominantly shaped by the National Biosafety Author-
ity, who made a sustained effort to define what counts as a 
valid SEC through a bottom-up process, prior to assessing 
the first application. The biosafety authority formalized the 
selection of relevant SECs in a standard operating proce-
dure and further shaped the process for assessing SECs so 
as to include input from socio-economic experts judging the 
completeness and robustness of the scientific information 
provided by the applicant, and to include public from other 
actors through a public consultation to which the applicants 
are invited to reply. Although the ways in which various 
actors are invited to participate is not without its problems, 
overall the process is designed with the intent to offer vari-
ous moments for stakeholder inclusion.
Despite these measures to ensure inclusion, expert review, 
and formalization, at this point it is not quite clear what evi-
dence is required for the assessment and when SECs make a 
difference in the decision to approve or reject an application. 
It is thus far unclear what the thresholds are for SECs to 
make a difference in decision-making and how positive and 
negative socio-economic impacts are weighed against each 
other. This lack of transparency endangers the credibility 
of the regulatory procedure as there currently is no way of 
finding out whether SECs have indeed been taken into con-
sideration. In combination with the seeming rationalization 
of SECs in the standard operation procedure, this lack of 
transparency runs the risk of obscuring the potentially con-
flicting social and economic interests that underlie the dif-
ferent considerations.
As for the evidence, although the expert reviewers for-
mally require applicants to provide evidence published in 
peer reviewed scientific journals, it is unrealistic to expect 
that applicants can meet this criteria for all the questions 
listed in the standard operating procedure, nor does this cri-
teria of scientific evidence clarify what kinds of evidence are 
deemed sufficient. The biosafety authority currently seems 
to take a pragmatic approach by using the criterion for sci-
entific evidence more as an objective rather than a stringent 
requirement, accepting evidence from peer reviewed publi-
cations on related technologies or on related countries, or 
even non-peer reviewed publications, in case peer reviewed 
publications on the technology in question in the Kenyan 
context is not available. It is not inconceivable that by tak-
ing such a pragmatic approach, over time a consensus about 
the standards of evidence will emerge from the interaction 
between applicants, expert reviewers, public comments and 
the biosafety authority. Any such tacit agreement over the 
standards of evidence can only emerge when requests for 
additional information are balanced with the practical limita-
tions and additional burden for applicants.
Socio‑economic considerations in South 
African biotechnology
Agricultural biotechnology regulation
Socio-economic considerations play a very different 
role in decision-making in South Africa. South Africa 
has been a pioneer in genetic modification on the South 
African continent. The country already had a regulatory 
body since 1979, the first field trials took place in 1987, 
and the first GMOs were allowed on the market in 1997, 
even if GMOs have been accompanied by significant soci-
etal controversy up to this day. In 1999 the government 
enacted a GMO Act that established a new regulatory 
structure, that abolished the older regulatory body and 
established two new bodies: an Advisory Council consist-
ing of biotechnology scientists that provides advice about 
the scientific validity of applications and an Executive 
Council with representatives from different government 
ministries. The Executive Council takes the final deci-
sion and for applications to be granted, members of the 
Executive Council have to reach a consensus: if only one 
of the ministry representatives has doubts, applications 
will be refused.
Both the SAGENE guidelines and the 1999 GMO Act 
were primarily concerned with risks to human health and 
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the environment and neither mentioned SECs. These first 
appeared in South African regulation in 2006, when the 
GMO Act was amended in order to align South African 
regulations to the Cartagena Protocol. The Act now notes 
that in reaching its decision, the Executive Council may 
consider “the potential socio-economic impact of such 
activities” (Republic of South Africa 2007, p. 11). And 
indeed SECs began to play an important role in decision-
making around the same time. Even though South Africa 
is known as being rather permissive towards GMOs, they 
have nevertheless banned several genetically modified 
crops on socio-economic grounds, as we will see shortly.
In the current regulatory procedure, like in Kenya, 
the applicant has to provide information on SECs when 
applying for environmental release, and like in Kenya, 
a public consultation forms part of this procedure. But 
other than that, the way SECs were included in South 
African decision-making strongly diverged from Kenya, 
and in this process, different conclusions were drawn 
about what counts as a valid concern and how this can 
best be measured. The information provided by the appli-
cant is not send out for peer review, it is not assessed by 
socio-economic experts, there have been no stakeholder 
workshops to identify the most relevant considerations, 
and there is no Standard Operating Procedure to stipulate 
what information is required for what SECs, even though 
the 2006 amendment to the GMO Act noted that the Min-
ister “may make regulations … prescribing the procedure 
to be followed by an applicant for the purpose of drawing 
up … socio-economic considerations” (Republic of South 
Africa 2007, p. 20).
Instead the process for assessing SECs was established 
in an ad hoc fashion as the Executive Council looked 
at the considerations arising from new applications on 
a case-to-case basis. Hence the description of the South 
African regulation of SECs will take a different structure. 
There have been two instances in which SECs played a 
decisive role in deciding the faith of an application: the 
application for a GM yeast in 2007 and the application 
for a GM potato in 2009. It is through the assessment of 
these cases, that various standards were established for 
what concerns were and were not considered valid, and 
what evidence was deemed required to take an objective 
decision.
GM yeast
The first time socio-economic considerations played a deci-
sive role was in 2006, when the government received an 
application for a genetically modified strain of malolactic 
yeast that could be used in the production of wine, one of 
South Africa’s best-known export products. Besides their 
function in fermentation, yeasts can also have effects on the 
taste of the wine and malolactic yeasts in particular are used 
by wine producers in the production of less acidic tasting 
wines like Chardonnay. Grapes naturally contain the acidic-
tasting malic acid and the malolactic yeast converts malic 
acid into the softer-tasting lactic acid. In 2006, a group of 
Canadian researchers had genetically modified a yeast strain 
so as to perform both alcoholic and malolactic fermentation 
at the same time (Husnik et al. 2006), raising the interest 
of researchers at Stellenbosch University Institute for Wine 
Biotechnology. In 2006 they applied for field trials, claiming 
‘proof of concept’ as the main purpose, and the Executive 
Council denied the application in September 2007 (EC min-
utes of 18 September 2007).
The possibility for contamination and gene flow to non-
GM yeast varieties played an important role the rejection. 
Although the applicants argued that the trial site would 
be effectively contained by covering the grapevines with 
nets to prevent seed dispersal, both civil society organiza-
tions and winemakers questioned the effectiveness of these 
measures (Jordan 2006). This gene flow was not considered 
important for maintaining biodiversity in yeast varieties: it 
was trade that was the central concern. The largest export 
markets for South African wineries were in Europe and it 
was perceived that the widespread resistance against geneti-
cally modified crops in Europe could negatively affect South 
African exports. Although the South African wine industry 
had long been supporting research into genetic modifica-
tion, they were eventually not willing to take the risk. The 
head winemaker at Spier Estate, a large wine estate close 
to the envisioned test site, clearly formulated this when he 
said that “for us on the production side, GMOs are a no-go” 
(Jordan 2006).
In preparing its decision, the Executive Council sent the 
application to the Advisory Council, who recommended 
approval, and they received letters from both wine mak-
ers and civil society organizations like Biowatch and the 
African Centre for Biodiversity (ACB). Although Biowatch 
also questioned the robustness of the risk assessment (ACB 
2006), it was the socio-economic impact on trade that was 
the main concern of the Executive Council. Representa-
tives from different ministries highlighted in the committee 
meeting that concerns existed surrounding the “impact on 
the marketability of the product, both within or outside the 
RSA” and the “demand for the product” (EC minutes of 
15 May 2007). The Department of Trade and Industry sub-
sequently sat down with the South African Wine Industry 
Council, the representative body of the wine industry, who 
clearly communicated:
“that they are against a general release due to the mas-
sive consumer resistance against GMOs, especially 
from the wine drinking consumers. The Council noted 
that the major export market for the wine industry is 
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the United Kingdom who is against GMOs and the 
local wine industry indicated that the risk is just too 
high” (EC minutes of 18 September 2007).
The representative of the DEAT, the only one who had 
voted in favour of approval in the May meeting, concluded 
that apparently “the international industry is not yet ready 
for a general release of malolactic wine yeast” (EC minutes 
of 18 September 2007).
The letters and opinions of the wine industry and non-
governmental organizations were deemed sufficient evidence 
for the proclaimed reluctance of European markets to buy 
the wines using the GM malolactic yeast and the Execu-
tive Council subsequently rejected the application on trade 
grounds, noting that “we are major exporters of wine, we 
cannot jeopardize those markets” (interview 14 April 2016).
GM potatoes
The second case where SECs played a decisive role con-
cerned an application for the general release of a genetically 
modified potato. This was by far the most high-profile case 
in the country, with active civil society protest and wide 
media coverage. The potato variety in question was modified 
in order to gain resistance to tuber moth, a moth whose lar-
vae damage potato tubers in storage. By inserting a gene of 
the Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), the protein would disrupt the 
digestion of the moths that eat the potato, thereby allowing 
farmers to grow potatoes using less pesticides. The project 
was funded by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and ran by the Agricultural Research 
Council (ARC), as part of a larger consortium that included 
the International Potato Centre, Syngenta, and Michigan 
State University, who had developed the original genetic 
modification (Douches et al. 2002).
The ARC had been conducting field trials with the Bt 
potato since 2001 and, in contrast to the yeast case, SECs 
only played out when the ARC applied for environmental 
release. Outside of the regulatory process, however, these 
concerns were raised much earlier. Already in 2004 civil 
society organizations like ACB and Biowatch formally filed 
an objection to the Executive Council protesting against the 
request for continued field trials (Ashton et al. 2004). They 
mainly protested the design of the environmental risk assess-
ment but also highlighted a wide range of SECs. They for 
instance argued that smallholder farmers could not benefit 
from a patented potato, which they would not be allowed to 
replant, and “which consumers in all likelihood will not buy” 
(Ashton et al. 2004, p. 6). The ACB furthermore questioned 
whether genetic modification was an effective solution to 
the tuber moth problem in the first place, pointing out that 
“tuber moths mainly affect tubers during storage” (Ashton 
et al. 2004, p. 4) and that it may be more effective to focus on 
“improving storage conditions to prevent infection of tubers 
after harvesting” (Ashton et al. 2004, p. 4).
The ARC was nevertheless allowed to pursue field trials 
with Bt potato and between 2000 and 2007 the Executive 
Council granted another nine applications for field trials, 
contained use, and trial release. Yet as the ARC consor-
tium moved closer towards environmental release, concerns 
about the socio-economic implications of the GM potato 
grew. When the Agricultural Research Council finally filed 
a request for the general release of the GM potato in July 
2008, the Executive Council rejected the application by 
unanimous decision (EC minutes of 21 July 2009; inter-
view 11 April 2016). The applicants subsequently filed an 
appeal in September 2009 and it took until March 2015 for 
the Minister of Agriculture of take a final decision on the 
application, eventually deciding to uphold the decision of the 
Executive Council not to allow the GM potato on the market 
(EC minutes of 24 March 2015).
Whereas the Executive Council is usually rather scant in 
its comments, in this case it cited a wide range of reasons in 
its July 2009 decision. These reasons for rejecting the GM 
potato can be grouped into two main categories: the benefits 
of the GM potato were insufficiently proven and the potato 
could potentially have a negative effect on South African 
potato exports.
The concern about trade, to start with the latter, had been 
raised in the previous years by several different actors. In 
2008, the African Centre for Biodiversity had published 
a book in which they pointed out that the great majority 
of South Africa’s potato exports are destined for various 
Southern African countries that had previously restricted the 
import of genetically modified products (Black 2008). And 
at least as important, in the same year various large retailers 
and processors in South Africa had publically stated their 
opposition to the GM potato. Woolworths and Pick & Pay, 
two of the largest supermarkets in South Africa, made clear 
they would not sell these potatoes and McDonalds wrote 
a letter to the Executive Council stating that they did not 
want to use genetically modified potatoes for their French 
fries (Hall 2008). Also McCain, a processing company from 
whom McDonalds purchased their potatoes, explicitly said 
that all their products are GM free. Their managing director 
was quoted saying: “we’re very much driven by consumer 
needs and they don’t want GM” (Gosling 2008). When 
the Executive Council finally consulted with Potato South 
Africa, the body representing the South African potato 
industry, who had initially had supported the Bt potato pro-
ject (interview 15 April 2016), they too said they would 
oppose GM potatoes. And so the government rejected the 
crop because the “the markets were not ready” (interview 
14 April 2016). The Executive Council cited this concern in 
their rejection when noting that “entry of these GM potatoes 
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into the formal trade remains a particular concern” (EC min-
utes of 21 July 2009).
The ARC consortium had repeatedly emphasized that the 
potato was also meant to bring benefits to South African 
farmers, and to subsistence farmers in particular, who do not 
produce potatoes for export. To substantiate these claims, 
their application included two socio-economic studies that 
sought to identify the agricultural needs and constraints by 
performing surveys amongst commercial and smallholder 
farmers (Jordaan and Carstens 2007; Hart and Vorster 2006). 
But while the studies set out to identify “the socio-economic 
benefits of the Bt potato” (Black 2008, p. 57 [italics added]), 
the results were rather mixed, to say the least. The studies 
showed that commercial farmers were willing to grow GM 
potatoes if this improved their output and profitability yet 
that tuber moth was not a dire problem to them and that 
they were sceptical it about pesticide savings, domestic mar-
ketability, and exportability (Jordaan and Carstens 2007). 
The survey amongst smallholder farmers, furthermore, con-
cluded that “farmers indicated a range of problems, many 
of which might be simply and cost effectively reduced by 
means of adopting existing technology to local conditions 
and practices” (Hart and Vorster 2006, p. 3). Tuber moth 
was mentioned by smallholder farmers as a problem but 
other challenges were mentioned much more frequently, like 
access to water and transport and damage done by other 
pests like millipedes, moles and cutworm.
The applicants concluded from this that a need for the 
GM potato had been proven. In addition, and perhaps in 
contradiction, they argued that proper “information on many 
of the socio-economic issues can only be collected if the 
application is approved” (Thomson et al. 2010), suggesting 
that these trials could be conducted with active participation 
by South African farmers. This claim effectively challenged 
the decision to ex ante assess the socio-economic impact of 
genetically modified organisms, claiming that this can only 
be done ex post (despite having performed ex-ante socio-
economic evaluations themselves). One civil society organ-
ization fiercely dismissed this proposal, noting that “it is 
shameful that the most vulnerable people in our society are 
being asked to take on the burden of experimenting with new 
and very expensive technology” (Stafford et al. 2008, p. 26).
This more fundamental challenge of whether ex ante or 
ex post assessments were necessary in the regulatory process 
was never responded to, however. The Executive Council 
went ahead and included SECs into their decision. Draw-
ing upon the very farmers surveys provided by the ARC, 
the Executive Council outright dismissed the applicants’ 
claims and decided that the benefits of the GM potato were 
insufficiently proven. The Executive Council concluded 
that commercial farmers did not expect the GM potato to 
be very beneficial “as the same spraying regime is required 
to manage other pests which this event does not target” (EC 
minutes of 21 July 2009). And smallholder farmers were 
cited to identify “more pressing challenges related to pro-
duction such as lack of water, seed availability, fertilizers, 
etc.” (EC minutes of 21 July 2009). This was aggravated by 
the observation that tuber moth, the pest that was targeted 
through the genetic modification, “is not a major pest for 
stored potatoes but rather rodents” (EC minutes of 21 July 
2009).
In the interviews with key South African stakeholders, 
several other reasons for rejecting the potato were suggested. 
For instance one scientist highlighted that the genetic modi-
fication was made in Spunta, a potato variety that was not 
widely grown by South African farmers (interview 15 April 
2016). Potato South Africa had earlier noted that this variety 
“is not suitable for processing, so the big food chains would 
not use it anyway” (Gosling 2008). And several interviewees 
further raised the suspicion that it may have played a role 
that no genetically modified potatoes had been allowed at 
that time anywhere in the world (interview 7 April 2016; 
Pretoria, 11 April 2016; Pretoria, 15 April 2016). As one 
interviewee said: “We don’t want to be the first. Who dares 
to be the first?” (interview 15 April 2016).
However, these concerns and the evidence provided for 
them did not appear in any official documentation and did 
not seem to play a role in the discussions leading up to the 
decision, while the Executive Council did provide a list of 
other objections in their rejection. The main concerns were 
the potentially negative impact on trade and domestic mar-
ketability, for which industry consultations provided suffi-
cient evidence, and the lack of benefits for smallholder farm-
ers, for which farmer’s surveys provided the most important 
evidence. Perhaps it is telling that although it only takes the 
objection of one member of the Executive Council for an 
application to be rejected, in the case of the GM potato the 
Executive Council rejected the application by an unanimous 
vote.
South Africa: ad hoc and case‑to‑case
The regulation of socio-economic considerations in South 
Africa took shape in an ad hoc fashion, on a case-to-case 
basis. At first sight this process was less inclusive than in 
Kenya and also scientific evidence played a much smaller 
role in South Africa. While the different considerations 
that were taken into account were certainly fed by con-
cerns that were articulated by a variety of actors in South 
Africa, ranging from corporations like McKain to civil 
society organizations like the ACB, the decision about 
what considerations were and were not taken into account 
was exclusively taken by the Executive Council. These 
civil servants were accountable to their respective min-
isters and they did not provide clarity to applicants about 
what information had to be provided with respect to SECs. 
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And in contrast to Kenya, the most decisive evidence con-
sisted of non-academic papers (like the farmers’ surveys) 
and letters from industry, all of which varied from case 
to case, and none of which was subjected to external peer 
review to establish the credibility of the claims.
The decisions about SECs furthermore lacked transpar-
ency. Like the board of the biosafety authority in Kenya, 
the Executive Council in South Africa provides little 
insight into how they arrived at their decision. They pub-
lish minutes of their meeting but these generally provide 
only little information.
The paradoxical outcome of this ad hoc process, how-
ever, is that over the years very clear standards have been 
established for what SECs are deemed valid. Genetically 
modified organisms will not be allowed on the South Afri-
can market if they adversely impact indigenous biodiver-
sity, potentially endanger exports, are unlikely to realize 
proclaimed benefits for smallholder farmers, and if they 
are not supported by those that eventually have to sell them 
to consumers. And also the evidence required for these 
claims is relatively clear, with stakeholder views being 
considered as sufficient evidence for assessing ‘if the mar-
kets are ready or not’. As one interviewee told me: “When 
someone says they don’t need something, they don’t neces-
sarily need scientific evidence or anything” (interview 4 
April 2016). Not all actors fully agreed on either the SECs 
included (the ACB and Biowatch argued also the relative 
efficacy vis-à-vis non-GMO solutions to improving potato 
yields should be considered)) nor on the type of evidence 
required (the ARC challenged the need for providing ex 
ante assessments). Yet after the yeast and potato decisions, 
it was relatively clear for all actors what role SECs play 
in decision-making.
Even though these standards are not written down any-
where, both regulators, civil society organizations, and 
industry organizations seem to know well what considera-
tions are important, when there is enough evidence for those 
considerations, and hence what applications do not stand a 
chance. In the words of one industry representative: “the 
whole potato story, if I can say that, left a mark on the pub-
lic companies” (interview 7 April 2016), a claim that rings 
equally true for the malolactic yeast story. Ever since these 
applications were rejected, no other applications have been 
filed that touched upon either of these issues. While the pro-
cess through which these standards were established was 
marked by substantial uncertainty and unpredictability, the 
current situation comes remarkably close to Falck-Zepeda’s 
(2009, p. 91) requirements for a system including SECs 
where the rules of the game are “transparent, well defined, 
protective, and understood by all actors and stakeholders.”
Discussion and conclusion
This article started by observing that actors around the world 
are struggling to ‘open up’ regulatory science to different 
types of issues and knowledges (Stirling 2008). The inclu-
sion of socio-economic considerations into biotechnology 
decision-making is a case in point. Omitting SECs is deemed 
undesirable because limiting decision-making to issues of 
risks to human health and the environment does not answer 
to widely held societal concerns about the impact of bio-
technology on other aspects of life. Yet including SECs 
in the absence of formalized methods for identifying and 
assessing what counts as a valid SEC runs the risk of creat-
ing a decision-making process that is both subjective and 
unpredictable.
This article aims to contribute to solving this dilemma 
by investigating the way Kenya and South Africa, in prac-
tice, have tried to move beyond the regulation of health and 
environmental risks by including SECs in biotechnology 
decision-making. This article has investigated both what 
SECs are (and are not) included, what evidence is required 
for these considerations to be deemed sufficiently credible, 
and how these considerations are eventually included in 
decision-making. By thus looking at the work that is put into 
crafting a regime of regulation in a context where standards 
for taking such decisions are lacking, I have identified two 
practice-based models for including SECs in biotechnology 
decision-making. These can be seen as two sets of practices 
by which subjective and politically contentious issues evolve 
over time towards more objective and predictable objects 
of regulation. The models, which can be labelled are sum-
marized in Table 3.
The regulatory regime for SECs are emerging in rather 
different ways in Kenya and South Africa. The Kenyan 
model is characterized by a sustained effort to define what 
counts as a valid socio-economic consideration through a 
bottom-up process prior to assessing the first application, 
with input from socio-economic experts judging the com-
pleteness and robustness of the information provided, and 
with a public consultation to which applicants are invited to 
reply. This can be understood as a definitive approach to reg-
ulate new object of concerns—as an attempt to include these 
considerations in specified and stable way, sealing the proce-
dure before the first assessment. The South African model is 
characterized by a case-to-case assessment by the Executive 
Council, that takes into account views from other actors in 
an ad hoc manner, and that does not require scientific evi-
dence of socio-economic impacts but instead largely draws 
upon farmer surveys and letters by representative organiza-
tions and key stakeholders, thereby establishing regulatory 
standards in the process. This can be understood as a tenta-
tive approach to regulate new objects of concerns—as an 
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ongoing process that is prudent and preliminary (Kuhlmann 
et al. 2019).
Perhaps more than anything else, the Kenyan and South 
African practices demonstrate the challenges pioneers face 
when translating concerns from subjective and politically 
contentious issues into more objective and predictable 
objects of regulation. This particularly becomes clear when 
observing the similarities between Kenya and South Africa 
compared to other countries, particularly Argentina (Falck-
Zepeda and Zambrano 2011; Binimelis and Myhr 2016). 
Argentina, which has signed but not ratified the Cartagena 
Protocol, has limited the assessment of SECs to the potential 
impacts on trade, specifically the competitiveness of Argen-
tinean exports (Falck-Zepeda and Zambrano 2011), and its 
regulations stipulate that the assessment of these consid-
erations should be conducted by one specific government 
agency on the basis of cost–benefit principles (Binimelis 
and Myhr 2016). While the exclusive focus on trade and 
on a well-established assessment method like cost–benefit 
analysis makes it easier for regulatory procedures to become 
objective and predictable, this in turn makes it more difficult 
to be responsive to the wide range of different considerations 
that gave to the societal controversy around GMOs in the 
first place. The regulatory practice in both Kenya and South 
Africa instead have dedicated places for societal actors to 
raise concerns and contribute evidence, and both countries 
subsequently consider a much broader spectrum of socio-
economic impacts, thereby being more responsive to consid-
erations raised by various societal actors. The two practice-
based models reflect different strategies for dealing with this.
The analysis shows that the two models produce distinct 
tensions. While the Kenyan ‘definitive model’ contains dif-
ferent moments for stakeholder inclusion, the lack of trans-
parency over how SECs are weighed into the decision-mak-
ing results in a lack of clarity as to what voices matter. And 
while there are high standards to ensure the credibility of the 
information provided, which in the long term may be a com-
mendable aim for creating objective regulations, in practice 
the emphasis on peer reviewed scientific publications cannot 
be realistically adhered to and does not specify the kinds of 
studies that are deemed best suited for the concerns in ques-
tion. And finally, while formalizing the procedure prior to 
the first assessment may increase the predictability of the 
regulatory procedure, this also runs the risk of obscuring 
the way conflicts over conflicting concerns are contested. In 
the South African ‘tentative model’, on the other hand, clear 
standards and thresholds have emerged regarding negative 
socio-economic impacts but there is uncertainty about both 
what new issues may emerge in the future and about what 
thresholds are operated in cases where distinct negative and 
positive socio-economic impacts have to be weighed. And 
while the pragmatic reliance on statements by key stakehold-
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is unlikely that this type of evidence is sufficient in cases 
where the socio-economic impact of new crops is unclear 
or contested. These tensions can serve as lessons for other 
countries aiming to include socio-economic considerations 
into biotechnology decision-making, highlighting that regu-
lations for SECs can be made objective and predictable in 
diverging ways, each with distinct benefits and drawbacks.
In many ways, creating regulations for socio-economic 
considerations is a learning process and these regulatory 
practices will therefore undoubtedly continue to evolve over 
time. This mirrors the trajectory taken by the regulation of 
risks to human health and the environment. These regula-
tions too once emerged from a shared concern—in this case 
for human health and the environment—in a context where 
consensus over the scope of these concerns and the methods 
for assessing them was lacking. The practices of regulating 
these risks has only emerged over the course of the last dec-
ades, as consensus slowly emerged over the scope of these 
considerations and the types of knowledge that are deemed 
credible in assessing them (Luhmann 1993; Boholm 2015). 
The regulation of SECs is arguably only at an early stage in 
this trajectory and subsequently is largely open to change.
Identifying these two models for including socio-eco-
nomic considerations into biotechnology decision-making is 
therefore both relevant and timely. Many countries currently 
intend to take into account SECs but struggle to implement 
it as detailed information about practical experiences with 
SECs in biotechnology regulation are absent. It should be 
clear that the two models for solving this problem presented 
in this article are shaped by the local contexts of Kenya 
and South Africa and therefore cannot unproblematically 
be copy-pasted to other countries. However, the in-depth 
description of the two models, as well as the identification 
of distinct tensions in each model, provides insight into two 
potential pathways for including SECs into biotechnology 
decision-making. This may help policy makers in devising 
robust regulations for SECs.
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